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TYPOGRAPHIC ERRORS IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF STATEMENTS 
In the Respondent's Brief on page 1, in Part I. Statement of 
the Case, Sub-Part A. Nature of the Case, reference is made to 
" ... after Burton's failure of an evidentiary test .... " This 
reference is likely a typographical error. Also, in the 
Respondent's Brief on page 1 in Part II. Statement of the Facts 
in the second paragraph, reference is made to "Officer Schneider 
served Peck .... " This reference is also likely a typographical 
error. 
REPLY ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
I. THE STATUTORY ADVICE IS DEFICIENT 
In the Appellant's Brief, Part III. of the Argument, 
commencing on Page 8, the Appellant asserts that the lack of 
notice in the Notice of Suspension advisory form (Agency R., pgs 
1-2) of the consequences of Idaho Code§ 49-335(2) fails to 
satisfy the notice requirements for implied consent of Idaho Code 
and of due process, as it fails to give notice of the provisions 
and consequences of Idaho Code§ 49-335(2). The Respondent ITD 
merely sets forth the statutory provision for notice in Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002A(2). The Respondent ITD fails to address in its 
Respondent's Brief the due process arguments, including the recent 
cases regarding the statutory and constitutional requirements. 
The Respondent ITD fails to address the concern raised in Wanner 
v. State, Dept. of Transp., 150 Idaho 164, 244 P.3d 1250, 1252 
(2011), that the Notice of Suspension advisory form does" ... not 
address the situation presented by ... the consequences of 
refusing or failing evidentiary testing for the holder of a CDL 
who was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of contact 
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with law enforcement. This is significant because I.C. § 49-
335(2) provides that a motorist who fails evidentiary testing is 
disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle for not less 
than one year." The Respondent ITD appears to ignore that 
implied consent is the basis for the notice provisions being in 
the statute and does ignore Peck's substantial right to be free 
of search or seizure. Implied consent requires notice of one's 
rights and the consequences. As no notice is given of the 
disqualification provisions of Idaho Code§ 49-335(2), there is 
no implied and no informed consent. 
II. THE AFFIDAVIT AND TEST RESULTS ARE LACKING 
In the Appellant's Brief, Part IV. of the Argument, 
commencing on Page 10, the Appellant asserts three specific 
deficiencies in the Affidavit and test results used to sustain 
the suspension (Agency R., pgs 3-8). The Respondent ITD only 
seeks to address the jurisdictional deficiency of showing that 
the acts occurred in the State of Idaho. The caption of the 
affidavit and the location where the officer signed the affidavit 
are not evidence of facts of the underlying conduct that is the 
subject of the affidavit. The inability of the Respondent ITD to 
point to any evidence other than the caption shows that the 
affidavit is defective to identify the alleged acts as occurring 
in the State of Idaho. 
In addition, when taken as a whole, the credibility of the 
affidavit and test results are lacking on their face. The 
Respondent ITD fails to even attempt to argue otherwise. The 
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credibility necessary for the affidavit testimony is too lacking 
to support the alleged facts and/or suspension. 
III. THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE 
In the Appellant's Brief, Part V. of the Argument, commencing 
on Page 11, the Appellant asserts that the speed limit in effect 
at the location was not 35 miles per hour based upon statute. The 
Respondent ITD attempts to rely upon the officer's general 
statement that the speed limit was posted at 35 miles per hour. 
The Respondent ITD fails to understand the provisions of Idaho 
Code§ 49-654(2) and Idaho Code§ 49-105(11). The allegation of 
a posted sign contrary to the actual speed limit is insufficient 
to show probable cause. 
The Respondent ITD fails to understand the statutory 
provision which would authorize an incorporated city to act. 
Further, the Respondent ITD also tries to dismiss the holding in 
Dabestani v. Bellus, 131 Idaho 542, 549, 961 P.2d 633, 638-640 
(1998), that a posted speed limit sign not in conformance with 
the actual speed limit is of no force and effect. The Respondent 
ITD indicates that the holding concerns a jury instruction, but 
the jury instruction involved was as to what the actual speed 
limit was (which was different than the speed limit sign which 
was posted). 
It cannot be preswned or even assumed that a posted speed 
limit sign controls what statutory District exists. The posting 
must comply with the District, as defined by statute, to be valid 
and enforceable. The Respondent ITD and its hearing officer 
cannot "assume" matters not in the record and contrary to the 
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statutory scheme establishing speed limits. 
IV. THE BAC TESTING DID NOT MEET THE APPLICABLE PROCEDURES 
In the Appellant's Brief, Part VI. of the Argument, 
commencing on Page 14, the Appellant asserts that Peck's 
testimony that he belched during the second 15 minute monitoring 
period meets his burden of proof to overcome the officer's 
probable cause form affidavit which only provides generalized 
statements regarding employment of proper procedures. The 
Respondent ITD attempts to characterize consistent evidence 
presented in the form affidavit and with the consistent evidence 
presented by Peck that there were two 15 minute observation 
periods, as somehow presenting evidence from the office that no 
belch occurred to controvert Peck's testimony. The facts of the 
belch are uncontroverted. The Respondent ITD fails to recognize 
that the holding in Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 
Idaho 141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009) is not limited to just 
circumstances where the officer leaves the room during the 
observation period. The hearing officer's findings and 
conclusion as to the belch are not support by any evidence in the 
record and are clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in the Petitioner's Brief and as set forth 
above, the decision of the Hearing Examiner sustaining the Notice 
of Suspension should be vacated, as well as the District Court's 
decisions sustaining the suspension. The relief sought is to 
reverse the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Order by 
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denying and/or vacating the suspension of the Peck's driving 
privileges, to reinstate the driving privileges, and if 
applicable, for an award to Peck of attorney fees and costs 
against the Respondent. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7~ft--{/ day of September, 2011. 
~ ~<--~---._ -~ 
HN A. FI Y 
rNNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Appellant PECK 
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